*The problem with learned essays of this kind is that they blandly presume the existence of international law. Also, why isn't the modern narcotics biz seen in the context of regulatory capture? The Zetas are elite antidrug guys who became the drug guys, because, under globalization, the flow of money is a given while the legality is a pretense.
*Oil is a conflict mineral. It's a lot easier to dismantle a government than it is to free a people of their oil addiction.
*Complaining that it's not fair for dopers to deal with terrorists is like complaining that Google and Apple cooperate too much. They're not stiff old-school bureaucracies that can be dismantled; they're a down-and-dirty P2P network that happens to raffle off dope.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/emerging-alliances.html
(((This "Cheky Harb" guy must have an interesting curriculum vitae. I bet he and Zhenli Ye Gon would have a lot to discuss.)))
(...)
"Another case that illustrates the breadth of the emerging alliances among criminal and terrorist groups is Operation Titan, executed by Colombian and U.S. officials in 2008 and still ongoing. Colombian and U.S. officials, after a 2-year investigation, dismantled a DTO (((A "drug trafficking organization." If you give this gaggle of merchants an acronym, then it sounds like they can be "dismantled"))) that stretched from Colombia to Panama, Mexico, the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. Most of the drugs originated with the FARC in Colombia, and some of the proceeds were traced through a Lebanese expatriate network to fund Hizballah, a radical Shi'ite Muslim terrorist organization that enjoys the state sponsorship of Iran and Syria.4
"Colombian and U.S. officials allege that one of the key money launderers in the structure, Chekry Harb (also known as "Taliban"), acted as the central go-between among Latin American DTOs and Middle Eastern radical groups, primarily Hizballah. Among the groups participating in Harb's operation in Colombia were members of the Northern Valley Cartel, right-wing paramilitary groups, and Marxist FARC.
"This mixture of enemies and competitors working through a common facilitator or in loose alliance for mutual benefit is a pattern that is becoming common—and one that significantly complicates the ability of law enforcement and intelligence operatives to combat, as multiple recent transcontinental cases demonstrate.
"In late 2010, the DEA used confidential informants in Mali to pose as FARC representatives seeking to move cocaine through the Sahel region. Three men claiming to belong to AQIM said the radical Islamists would protect the cocaine shipments, leading to the first indictment ever of al Qaeda affiliates on narcoterrorism charges.5 Those claiming to be AQIM associates were willing to transport hundreds of kilos of cocaine across the Sahara Desert to Spain for the price of $2,000 per kilo.6 That case came just 4 months after Malian military found a Boeing 727 abandoned in the desert after unloading an estimated 20 tons of cocaine, clear evidence that large shipments are possible. The flight originated in Venezuela.7
"In another indication of cross-pollination among criminal organizations, in late 2010, Ecuadorian counterdrug officials announced the dismantling of a particularly violent gang of cocaine traffickers, led by Nigerians who were operating in a neighborhood near the international airport in the capital of Quito. According to Ecuadorian officials, the gang, in addition to controlling the sale of cocaine in one of Quito's main districts, was recruiting "mules" or drug carriers to carry several kilos at a time to their allied network based in Amsterdam to distribute throughout Europe.
"The Nigerian presence was detected because they brought a new level of violence to the drug game in Quito, such as beheading competitors...."
